Gary Lineker is right to remind us that the UK's TV licence fee — which funds the BBC — is a tax. Although not officially described as a tax until 2006, it was effectively one long before that.
My district council charges for providing and emptying a brown bin used for garden waste. This is analogous to a commercial fee: I choose whether to pay the charge, in exchange for a specific service. The TV licence fee may have had a similar character when it was introduced in 1946, but after non-BBC channels arrived in the 1950s, so that the revenue raised by the charge became disconnected from the services used, it effectively became a tax on TV sets.
Whatever the pros and cons of using taxes to finance a public broadcaster, the administration of a tax should be managed by the state or an agency of the state. Control of TV licensing should never have passed to the BBC, as it did in 1991.
The debate over free licences for the over-75s is embroiling the BBC still further in matters that should be the province of the state. The government should not have withdrawn funding for this in the expectation that the BBC would work out its own concessionary schemes. If the BBC becomes responsible for means-testing, it risks taking on even more quasi-governmental functions.
If the license fee is retained, it should be as a conventional tax, as for vehicle licensing, and it should be administered by the state. The people who call at your home to quiz you, or attempt to prosecute you, should be members of the state apparatus — not employees of the BBC or one of its subcontractors.
07 February 2020
31 January 2020
denial
Further to the previous post, the article by Matthew Goodwin about the 2010s is revealing, both about political changes during the decade and about the intelligentsia's reaction to them.
In one passage, Professor Goodwin exploits the ambiguity of the term liberalism to make some familiar complaints about capitalism:
Socialism has always had two strands:
(1) concern for the less advantaged
(2) the desire to run the world on supposedly rational and just principles.
The second strand came to the fore in the scientific planning utopias of the 1920s that were popular with intellectuals such as H.G. Wells, and which eventually manifested in extreme forms such as Nazism and Stalinism. In a milder form, this strand has become a ubiquitous feature of Western societies, with medicine, education, childcare and the universities all subject to intervention in the cause of 'rationality' and 'fairness'.
The counter-revolution may well be a reaction to strand 2, but if the Left were to acknowledge this, it might require a retreat from their ambition to manage everything in accordance with leftist ideology.
In one passage, Professor Goodwin exploits the ambiguity of the term liberalism to make some familiar complaints about capitalism:
Liberalism gave us individual rights and protected those rights through the rule of law. But it also attached itself to the most dynamic and successful economic system the world has ever known and which an ascendant middle class came to love: capitalism.Unpacking this quote deserves more space than I am able to give it, but one may for example wish to take issue with the idea that the liberalism that gave us the rule of law is the same liberalism that is now allegedly under attack from the reaction against socialism. Goodwin's attempt to reduce the counter-revolution to alleged popular unease about capitalism seems like an inversion.
The events of the past decade revealed how these two in-built advantages had come unstuck. Liberalism has won many important battles, but it also crafted societies in which millions of people today no longer feel recognised or rewarded.
Socialism has always had two strands:
(1) concern for the less advantaged
(2) the desire to run the world on supposedly rational and just principles.
The second strand came to the fore in the scientific planning utopias of the 1920s that were popular with intellectuals such as H.G. Wells, and which eventually manifested in extreme forms such as Nazism and Stalinism. In a milder form, this strand has become a ubiquitous feature of Western societies, with medicine, education, childcare and the universities all subject to intervention in the cause of 'rationality' and 'fairness'.
The counter-revolution may well be a reaction to strand 2, but if the Left were to acknowledge this, it might require a retreat from their ambition to manage everything in accordance with leftist ideology.
24 January 2020
hegemony
Politics professor Matthew Goodwin produced an interesting review of the 2010s decade for The Times. Commenting on the apparent shift to the right, he criticises leftists for responding to it by
There are two reasons why recent changes in America and Britain would be better described in terms of a mild counter-revolution than a change in hegemony. First, we have to separate style from substance. The rhetoric of Donald Trump is very different from that of previous US presidents; and the current UK government feels like a significant departure from the ideological complacency of the Blair and Cameron eras. In terms of actual policy changes, however, little happened during the 2010s that could be described as deviating from the leftist-interventionist paradigm.
The second reason why references to change of hegemony are premature is that commentators fail to distinguish between political and cultural hegemony. Political theory appears not to have caught up with a phenomenon dating from the 1980s: governments being notionally right-wing, while the cultural establishment remains firmly left-leaning and is openly rejecting of moves to the right, however democratically based. The hostility of the cultural elites towards Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan provided a good illustration. We saw the phenomenon repeated more recently with Donald Trump, and may well experience the same with Boris Johnson (we had a possible foretaste with the Supreme Court's ruling on prorogation). Until there is some definite change in the politics of the cultural establishment — say, a clear sign of the BBC renouncing its programme of excess political correctness — reports about the demise of 'liberal' hegemony are likely to be exaggerated.
We have to remember, of course, that the concept of hegemony is charged with significance for a Marx-inspired Left, since in terms of their ideology it is normally something to be criticised rather than endorsed. Hence complaining that the hegemony is right-wing (and thus to be opposed) will generally be preferable for them, compared to having to acknowledge that it is they who are hegemonic.
retreating to their gated communities and bunkering down, self-selecting their activist base, echo chambers and social networks in which everybody looks and sounds like them.Like many in his profession, however, Professor Goodwin overstates the significance of the shift. He suggests that the decade represented the end of liberal hegemony (he uses "liberal" in the American sense of leftist-interventionist).
There are two reasons why recent changes in America and Britain would be better described in terms of a mild counter-revolution than a change in hegemony. First, we have to separate style from substance. The rhetoric of Donald Trump is very different from that of previous US presidents; and the current UK government feels like a significant departure from the ideological complacency of the Blair and Cameron eras. In terms of actual policy changes, however, little happened during the 2010s that could be described as deviating from the leftist-interventionist paradigm.
The second reason why references to change of hegemony are premature is that commentators fail to distinguish between political and cultural hegemony. Political theory appears not to have caught up with a phenomenon dating from the 1980s: governments being notionally right-wing, while the cultural establishment remains firmly left-leaning and is openly rejecting of moves to the right, however democratically based. The hostility of the cultural elites towards Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan provided a good illustration. We saw the phenomenon repeated more recently with Donald Trump, and may well experience the same with Boris Johnson (we had a possible foretaste with the Supreme Court's ruling on prorogation). Until there is some definite change in the politics of the cultural establishment — say, a clear sign of the BBC renouncing its programme of excess political correctness — reports about the demise of 'liberal' hegemony are likely to be exaggerated.
We have to remember, of course, that the concept of hegemony is charged with significance for a Marx-inspired Left, since in terms of their ideology it is normally something to be criticised rather than endorsed. Hence complaining that the hegemony is right-wing (and thus to be opposed) will generally be preferable for them, compared to having to acknowledge that it is they who are hegemonic.
17 January 2020
post truth
It is hard to take the "post-truth" critique movement seriously, given it seems to suffer from the very defects it claims to deplore: dishonesty and a disregard for facts.
Ostensibly the movement bewails that politicians are bending the truth and that the public is willing to swallow lies — phenomena as old as the hills. However, what is likely to be a greater reason for cognoscenti discomfort is the tendency, allegedly increasing, to question the wisdom of supposed experts. The discomfort may be largely about loss of power, but is wrapped up in concern for veracity.
The movement likes to claim that many people's attitude to facts is selective at best, but it's not clear that it scores any better on this issue. For example, the movement likes to cite Brexit as an illustration of the post-truth tendency: Brits who voted to leave the EU were allegedly motivated by considerations that are not supported by facts, and allegedly ignored counterarguments based on hard data. None of the articles about post-truth I have read takes note of the fact that UK voters' scepticism about official pronouncements may have been justified, if those pronouncements were deliberately slanted towards what officials believed was the 'right' answer (i.e. Remain).
If the alleged loss of faith in experts has been triggered by increasing awareness that their advice is driven partly, or even predominantly, by factors other than truth — e.g. what they consider to be the greater good — experts may need to look for the source of the problem in themselves.
Ostensibly the movement bewails that politicians are bending the truth and that the public is willing to swallow lies — phenomena as old as the hills. However, what is likely to be a greater reason for cognoscenti discomfort is the tendency, allegedly increasing, to question the wisdom of supposed experts. The discomfort may be largely about loss of power, but is wrapped up in concern for veracity.
The movement likes to claim that many people's attitude to facts is selective at best, but it's not clear that it scores any better on this issue. For example, the movement likes to cite Brexit as an illustration of the post-truth tendency: Brits who voted to leave the EU were allegedly motivated by considerations that are not supported by facts, and allegedly ignored counterarguments based on hard data. None of the articles about post-truth I have read takes note of the fact that UK voters' scepticism about official pronouncements may have been justified, if those pronouncements were deliberately slanted towards what officials believed was the 'right' answer (i.e. Remain).
If the alleged loss of faith in experts has been triggered by increasing awareness that their advice is driven partly, or even predominantly, by factors other than truth — e.g. what they consider to be the greater good — experts may need to look for the source of the problem in themselves.
10 January 2020
rule of law
I note there is an article at Policy Exchange by John Finnis, Oxford professor emeritus of Law and Legal Philosophy, arguing that the Supreme Court's annulment of Boris Johnson's prorogation was "wholly unjustified by law" and that it has caused "damage [...] to our constitutional doctrine and settlement."
The rule of law requires that governments can be held accountable to the law. It also requires that the law not be applied arbitrarily: sticking to the letter as far as possible, minimising scope for discretionary interpretation, and not looking at intention unless this is explicitly called for. It is only an ideal of course, but it's an important one.
[The judgment] ignores most of the immediately relevant statutory and political constraints and contextualising factors, and illustrates the ineptitude of judicial forays into high politics.The Times's former legal editor, Frances Gibb, points out that Supreme Court President Baroness Hale "has left a web from which judges must now disentangle themselves". The government is apparently considering "greater political oversight of judicial appointments to curb 'activist rulings'."
Lady Hale insists that judges do not overstep the mark. They only look at the legality of actions by ministers, she says, and not the underlying reasons. But the very lack of a cited reason, "let alone a good reason", was central to the justices' ruling on the suspension of parliament.It would be unfortunate if an undesirable intrusion of politics into Supreme Court logic results in the Court becoming more answerable to politicians.
The rule of law requires that governments can be held accountable to the law. It also requires that the law not be applied arbitrarily: sticking to the letter as far as possible, minimising scope for discretionary interpretation, and not looking at intention unless this is explicitly called for. It is only an ideal of course, but it's an important one.
03 January 2020
trade war
One of the more interesting phenomena of 2019 has been the continuation of the US-China trade war. I am not sure what US President Donald Trump was trying to achieve by ratcheting up tariffs on imports (predictably leading to reciprocal tariffs by China) but the whole episode appears to have defied the conventional logic of textbook economic theory. While stockmarket valuations are not a foolproof predictor of economic fortunes, the continuing (albeit gradual) rise of US stock indices over the period 2018-2019 suggests that the overall effects on the US economy have been either neutral or even positive.
The US's 'experiment' with tariffs illustrates one of the problems with economic theories: they may only work under a fairly stringent set of conditions. If markets are already distorted in one way, predicting the effects of further distorting them in some other way may be difficult or impossible.
It is not clear to what extent Mr Trump's objectives have been achieved, but it was a bold move to defy the orthodoxy and — so far at least — critics of his trade policy appear to have been proved wrong.
The US's 'experiment' with tariffs illustrates one of the problems with economic theories: they may only work under a fairly stringent set of conditions. If markets are already distorted in one way, predicting the effects of further distorting them in some other way may be difficult or impossible.
It is not clear to what extent Mr Trump's objectives have been achieved, but it was a bold move to defy the orthodoxy and — so far at least — critics of his trade policy appear to have been proved wrong.
29 November 2019
the second referendum
• Rightly or wrongly, the upcoming UK election looks like turning into the long-threatened second referendum. With Labour imploding, the Lib Dems are the obvious second choice and have effectively become the official anti-Brexit party. There is little doubt they would — if they could — deliver non-Brexit, and without being plagued by ambivalence. The Conservatives are in the role of pro-Brexit party but their level of wholeheartedness seems less clear-cut, though there is no doubting the determination of their leader.
Three years is a long time. Are voters still clear enough on what the Brexit issues are? I know what my own position is, but that is based largely on the illiberality of the EU state, a topic that may not be of much interest to the majority. As far as economics goes, the net effect of EU membership is too difficult to quantify even to say whether it’s positive or negative. There is a lot more to EU policy than free trade, much of it market-distorting.
Do the people who voted for Brexit in 2016 still care enough to vote for it again? Not much has happened to make the choice any easier. True, it has emerged that the pessimistic warnings of Project Fear were probably wrong. But we have also had plenty of anti-Brexit and anti-Brexiteer propaganda since the referendum. The Brexit movie painted Leave campaign director Dominic Cummings as a hero, but portrayed Leave voters as being of questionable intelligence (see Focus Group scene).
Undemocratic it may be, to make people choose again, but that's to some extent what we are being presented with. The Conservatives may need to remind voters about the arguments for leaving, if they do not want to see major losses to the Lib Dems. That is, assuming they can sound convincing. If not, it's probably best to stay silent.
• Journalists regularly remind us that the UK is suffering from a housing crisis, but the interpretations offered tend to reveal confused thinking. If the population rises by half a million every year, the urbanisation process continues, and people increasingly live alone, a chronic housing shortfall is to be expected. Add foreign investment in properties left empty, and the problem becomes extreme. But this phenomenon gets muddled up with the separate issue of wealth inequality and the fact that property ownership has become more concentrated so that more people are having to rent. Attacking the wealth disparity isn't going to solve the housing shortage, but that doesn't stop commentators wanting to blame property owners — baby boomers, the bourgeoisie, etc.
If the housing stock is too low and most people can only afford to rent, it follows that most new private properties will (at least initially, until the pressure has abated) need to be purchased by the well-off and rented out, in order to alleviate the problem. So perhaps it's the well-off who need to be induced to buy to let, if market demand for new property is to rise sufficiently to make builders want to build. This argument, however, conflicts with egalitarian morality.
Rather than using carrots to encourage more letting, most commentators prefer the idea of sticks for beating second-home owners: e.g. threatening a higher rate of council tax, or strengthening tenants' rights. The Times's Libby Purves endorses the stick approach, justifying it by referring to
The belief that they don't think they are special, they realise they are just like us, and only want to help us — a fantasy rarely questioned by even the most cynical journalists — is surely one of the key reasons we have been ruled by leftist governments for the last thirty years. (More about the ideology of the pseudo-egalitarian elite can be found in George Walden's The New Elites, and in my own book The Ideology of the Elites.)
Prince Andrew seems to have unwisely associated with a number of unsavoury characters over the years. Rather than being too aloof, he may not have been aloof enough.
• This blog will be back in 2020.
Three years is a long time. Are voters still clear enough on what the Brexit issues are? I know what my own position is, but that is based largely on the illiberality of the EU state, a topic that may not be of much interest to the majority. As far as economics goes, the net effect of EU membership is too difficult to quantify even to say whether it’s positive or negative. There is a lot more to EU policy than free trade, much of it market-distorting.
Do the people who voted for Brexit in 2016 still care enough to vote for it again? Not much has happened to make the choice any easier. True, it has emerged that the pessimistic warnings of Project Fear were probably wrong. But we have also had plenty of anti-Brexit and anti-Brexiteer propaganda since the referendum. The Brexit movie painted Leave campaign director Dominic Cummings as a hero, but portrayed Leave voters as being of questionable intelligence (see Focus Group scene).
Undemocratic it may be, to make people choose again, but that's to some extent what we are being presented with. The Conservatives may need to remind voters about the arguments for leaving, if they do not want to see major losses to the Lib Dems. That is, assuming they can sound convincing. If not, it's probably best to stay silent.
• Journalists regularly remind us that the UK is suffering from a housing crisis, but the interpretations offered tend to reveal confused thinking. If the population rises by half a million every year, the urbanisation process continues, and people increasingly live alone, a chronic housing shortfall is to be expected. Add foreign investment in properties left empty, and the problem becomes extreme. But this phenomenon gets muddled up with the separate issue of wealth inequality and the fact that property ownership has become more concentrated so that more people are having to rent. Attacking the wealth disparity isn't going to solve the housing shortage, but that doesn't stop commentators wanting to blame property owners — baby boomers, the bourgeoisie, etc.
If the housing stock is too low and most people can only afford to rent, it follows that most new private properties will (at least initially, until the pressure has abated) need to be purchased by the well-off and rented out, in order to alleviate the problem. So perhaps it's the well-off who need to be induced to buy to let, if market demand for new property is to rise sufficiently to make builders want to build. This argument, however, conflicts with egalitarian morality.
Rather than using carrots to encourage more letting, most commentators prefer the idea of sticks for beating second-home owners: e.g. threatening a higher rate of council tax, or strengthening tenants' rights. The Times's Libby Purves endorses the stick approach, justifying it by referring to
the morally reprehensible idea that in a time of shortage it is OK to treat dwellings as mere investments.Ms Purves believes (among other things) that we need "better security for all tenants", an approach which seems as likely to exacerbate the shortage problem as to help. The perspective of property owners is airily waved off:
If that scares off amateur landlords, who cares? Let councils buy their assets, cheap.• The Sun's Dan Wootton condemns Prince Andrew for seeming "aloof", contrasting HRH's BBC interview unfavourably with Princess Diana's:
[...] Princess Diana's Panorama interview proved without any doubt that she was one of us [...]The 1995 Panorama programme, featuring Princess Diana's revelations about royal life, seems to have been stage-managed better than Prince Andrew's "car crash" interview. A woman with a sob story is of course an easier sell than a man denying a sex crime. It seems doubtful, however, that Princess Diana thought of herself as "one of us" (unless "us" means people who dislike the Royal Family), just as it seems doubtful that the average left-wing technocrat thinks of the people he supposedly wishes to help as being like himself.
The belief that they don't think they are special, they realise they are just like us, and only want to help us — a fantasy rarely questioned by even the most cynical journalists — is surely one of the key reasons we have been ruled by leftist governments for the last thirty years. (More about the ideology of the pseudo-egalitarian elite can be found in George Walden's The New Elites, and in my own book The Ideology of the Elites.)
Prince Andrew seems to have unwisely associated with a number of unsavoury characters over the years. Rather than being too aloof, he may not have been aloof enough.
• This blog will be back in 2020.
15 November 2019
Grenfell Tower
• According to the Phase 1 Report from the inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire, residents of the Tower were initially advised by the Fire Brigade not to evacuate the building. A few residents chose to ignore this advice. With hindsight, it seems it would have been better if they had all ignored it.
It appears the initial advice of the Fire Brigade would have been appropriate if the building had conformed to required building standards. However, the building did not conform to required standards, rendering it more flammable than expected.
It has been suggested that ignoring the Fire Brigade’s initial instructions might have had something to do with common sense. It is not clear that there are any conclusions of this kind to be drawn. Anyone, however risk-averse, might well have decided to follow official advice in a situation of this kind. If there are psychological implications, they seem more likely to be about a culture of faith in experts than about common sense.
We are constantly pressured to consult professionals, with regard to a wide range of everyday matters. To solve our relationship problems, we require relationship counsellors. To solve our psychological problems, we need to to consult the psychiatrically trained. Problems with children require parenting or child counsellors. We are pressured to get tested for possible diseases, and to receive professional advice about the results.
On the packaging of practically every over-the-counter remedy, there are exhortations to consult your doctor, either before use or in the event of an adverse reaction. Considered in aggregate, these exhortations are grossly unrealistic. Much of the time, the average GP would probably have little to contribute to such cases. If all the warnings given on packaging were rigorously followed, doctors would be even more overwhelmed than they already are.
The demand that we should believe in the power of expertise, and follow authorised opinion, has the effect of infantilising and disempowering us. We feel we must bow to the superior knowledge of the trained official. We cannot be allowed to think for ourselves, because there is always someone who knows better.
The cult of the expert is founded on various ideals that do not stand up to scrutiny. E.g. the theory that training necessarily turns someone into a person with superior powers of judgment. In relation to state services, it depends on the thesis that different parts of the bureaucratic machinery can each be relied on to do things in the agreed way, so that one part can safely assume that another part has behaved according to published standards.
In fact, the various parts of the state apparatus are subject to intense cost pressures, as well as human error. This is before we even consider the lack of economic incentive to operate to standards that go beyond the immediately obvious.
It is not just the public who are liable to become overconfident about the validity of assertions made by professionals. Professionals themselves are liable to place too much confidence in the assertions of other professionals. Particularly in crisis situations, they may be required to place excessive reliance on mechanical instructions provided by manuals and training courses, rather than on their own judgment.
• Electable government officials compete for power by offering voters benefits. For example, more social housing. At the same time, voters are reluctant to have their taxes increased to pay for these additional benefits. The result is pressure to achieve readily countable targets (e.g. number of new houses or apartments built) at minimum cost and hence with minimum attention to background safety and durability aspects. Deficits in background aspects will not necessarily be discovered until much later, if at all.
In the absence of obvious incentives not to cut corners, it falls to government officials to develop an internal culture in which safety is given more priority than is likely to be appreciated by voters in the short term. In this, they need to be supported by the media.
For example, in relation to the current election campaigns, parties might avoid offering to expand public services unless at the same time they give weight in their campaigns to (a) the effects of any such expansion on taxes and (b) the hidden costs of ensuring that services are provided to an adequate standard. The media might insist that these aspects of social welfare offerings be given adequate attention.
In particular, the question should be asked whether any expansion in UK social housing should be offered to voters, unless accompanied by a commitment to first investigating all existing social housing, with regard to fire and other risks — and rectifying any problems that are identified.
It appears the initial advice of the Fire Brigade would have been appropriate if the building had conformed to required building standards. However, the building did not conform to required standards, rendering it more flammable than expected.
It has been suggested that ignoring the Fire Brigade’s initial instructions might have had something to do with common sense. It is not clear that there are any conclusions of this kind to be drawn. Anyone, however risk-averse, might well have decided to follow official advice in a situation of this kind. If there are psychological implications, they seem more likely to be about a culture of faith in experts than about common sense.
We are constantly pressured to consult professionals, with regard to a wide range of everyday matters. To solve our relationship problems, we require relationship counsellors. To solve our psychological problems, we need to to consult the psychiatrically trained. Problems with children require parenting or child counsellors. We are pressured to get tested for possible diseases, and to receive professional advice about the results.
On the packaging of practically every over-the-counter remedy, there are exhortations to consult your doctor, either before use or in the event of an adverse reaction. Considered in aggregate, these exhortations are grossly unrealistic. Much of the time, the average GP would probably have little to contribute to such cases. If all the warnings given on packaging were rigorously followed, doctors would be even more overwhelmed than they already are.
The demand that we should believe in the power of expertise, and follow authorised opinion, has the effect of infantilising and disempowering us. We feel we must bow to the superior knowledge of the trained official. We cannot be allowed to think for ourselves, because there is always someone who knows better.
The cult of the expert is founded on various ideals that do not stand up to scrutiny. E.g. the theory that training necessarily turns someone into a person with superior powers of judgment. In relation to state services, it depends on the thesis that different parts of the bureaucratic machinery can each be relied on to do things in the agreed way, so that one part can safely assume that another part has behaved according to published standards.
In fact, the various parts of the state apparatus are subject to intense cost pressures, as well as human error. This is before we even consider the lack of economic incentive to operate to standards that go beyond the immediately obvious.
It is not just the public who are liable to become overconfident about the validity of assertions made by professionals. Professionals themselves are liable to place too much confidence in the assertions of other professionals. Particularly in crisis situations, they may be required to place excessive reliance on mechanical instructions provided by manuals and training courses, rather than on their own judgment.
• Electable government officials compete for power by offering voters benefits. For example, more social housing. At the same time, voters are reluctant to have their taxes increased to pay for these additional benefits. The result is pressure to achieve readily countable targets (e.g. number of new houses or apartments built) at minimum cost and hence with minimum attention to background safety and durability aspects. Deficits in background aspects will not necessarily be discovered until much later, if at all.
In the absence of obvious incentives not to cut corners, it falls to government officials to develop an internal culture in which safety is given more priority than is likely to be appreciated by voters in the short term. In this, they need to be supported by the media.
For example, in relation to the current election campaigns, parties might avoid offering to expand public services unless at the same time they give weight in their campaigns to (a) the effects of any such expansion on taxes and (b) the hidden costs of ensuring that services are provided to an adequate standard. The media might insist that these aspects of social welfare offerings be given adequate attention.
In particular, the question should be asked whether any expansion in UK social housing should be offered to voters, unless accompanied by a commitment to first investigating all existing social housing, with regard to fire and other risks — and rectifying any problems that are identified.
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